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Abstract: As an important part of market information, accounting information reveals the timeliness, which plays an 
extremely important role to the market supervisors and investors. This research took 852 annual financial reports, published 
by Chinese Growth Enterprise Market(GEM) listing corporations from 2012-2014, as the samples to do empirical research 
on the board structure’s influences on the accounting information disclosure. The results showed that the board structure had 
influences on the timeliness of accounting information disclosure in a certain extent, CEO duality in listing corporation had 
negative correlation with the timeliness of accounting information disclosure, and the proportion of independent directors 
had positive correlation with it.  
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1.  INTRUDUCTION 
1.1 Research background and meanings 
The timeliness of accounting information disclosure is defined that users can get the accounting 
information in specified or demanded time limit, which is an important property of accounting information 
quality. So far, both Chinese and foreign scholars have examined the factors which have influences on the 
timeliness of accounting information disclosure, such as company’s scale, industry, audit opinions, business 
complexity, all of which are often seemed as tested variables , but with seldom research on the influences of the 
internal structure of corporation governance on the timeliness of accounting information disclosure. The board is 
the important part of corporation governance structure, for example, Fama thought the board is a significant 
internal control mechanism[1]. The board has influences on the efficiency of internal control and then affects the 
efficiency of accounting information disclosure. Therefore, particularly for stock regulators, 
shareholders(especially medium and small shareholders) and creditors, the timeliness of accounting information 
disclosure under the control of the board is gradually becoming the focus. By means of the timeliness of 
accounting information disclosure associated with the board, it proposes and verifies some conclusions that the 
board structure may affect the timeliness of accounting information disclosure, which provides methods to 
improve the resource allocation efficiency of capital market and the board structure of listing corporation, it also 
provides some useful ideas for the supervision department to improve the timeliness of accounting information 
disclosure. 
The GEM listing corporations service for independent innovation enterprises and other growth oriented 
enterprises with low threshold, weak internal control etc. One of the requirements of accounting information 
quality is the timeliness of accounting information. The corporate governance structure and mechanism are very 
important, among many factors that have affected accounting information quality of GEM listing corporations. 
But it is the board of directors that play a fundamental role in corporate governance. Therefore, investing the 
relationship of the GEM board and its timeliness of accounting information disclosure have theoretical value 
and practical siginificance. 
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1.2 Literature reviews 
The domestic and foreign scholars have fully studied the influence factors of the timeliness of accounting 
information disclosure, company’s scale[2] [3],types of message [4] [5],audit opinions [6] [7] and so on. This paper 
focus on the relationship between the board structure and the timeliness of accounting information disclosure. 
In the scale of the board, some scholars thought it had negative correlations with the timeliness of 
accounting information disclosure. As Fama and Jensen(1983) pointed out, the fewer number of the board, the 
higher effectiveness of supervision[8]. And then Lipton and Lorsch (1992) showed that the communication will 
drive down the efficiency of the board, if the number were more than 10[9]. But others, like Guan 
Baogang(2013) ,figured out that the scale of the board didn’t have obvious correlations with information 
disclosure quality[10]. Of course, opinions about it varies and meanwhile other parts of the board structure were 
widely discussed, like the proportion of independent directors and CEO duality. Such as Forker (1992) found 
that CEO duality had negative correlations with the information disclosure of listing Corporation[11], because 
supervision of managers would be decreased and then would affect the timeliness of accounting information 
disclosure. Qi Weishan and Ouyang Lingnan(2005) thought that the proportion of independent directors had 
negative correlations with listing companies’ annual reports delay[12]. Gao Yanping and Wang Pingxin(2007) had 
also reached an agreement: the larger proportion of independent directors of listing corporations[13], the better 
function independent directors system in the timeliness of annual reports’ disclosure would make. 
Generally speaking, domestic and foreign scholars have done systematic analysis on the timeliness of 
accounting information disclosure, but mostly from aspects of earnings and audit opinions, seldom from the 
perspective of the board structure, and some scholars have different opinions about relevant researches. In 
addition, domestic scholars have done the research based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares, which 
includes a certain number of state-owned enterprises. The research thinks that the entrepreneurial enterprises 
gradually become the main power of economic transformation taking the economic background of China into 
account, because the state-owned enterprises’ background and management ways differ from the general listing 
corporation. So this paper chose the GEM Listing Corporation as the research object to make a preliminary 
discussion on the problem of the board structure of the timeliness of accounting information disclosure. It is 
very important to explore the impact of the board affecting the timeliness of accounting disclosure. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL BASIS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The reason why accounting information disclosure was born is that information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts between managers and outside investors came into being because of the problems of information and 
agency[14]. In the company law and governance practices, the board had absolute power in the supervision of 
managers as the spokesman of shareholders, including leading external information disclosure of firms.  
The board of directors, which should be elected by shareholders' meeting, is regarded as the representative 
of the shareholders to executive supervision and management. If the top ten shareholders are related in the fact 
of higher ownership concentration, it will harm the medium and small shareholders’ benefits because it is easy 
for shareholders with high proportion to delay information disclosure. Therefore, the following hypothesis was 
put forward. 
Hypothesis 1: With other conditions limited, the relationship between the top ten shareholders and the 
timeliness of accounting information is negatively related. It is timelier to disclose accounting information if the 
top ten shareholders are not related.  
The scale of the board is a significant factor to influence the degree of information disclosure. As the key of 
the companies’ governance mechanism, the appropriate scale of the board can improve the timeliness of 
accounting information disclosure in the suitable range. If it is too large, it will have a strong influence on the 
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working efficiency of the board. On the contrary, the justice of the board work will be questioned. So the 
effectiveness of corporation governance will be improved in suitable range with the appropriate raising in the 
scale of the board. Therefore, the following hypothesis was put forward. 
Hypothesis 2: With other conditions limited, the scale of the board is positively related to the timeliness of 
accounting information disclosure. 
Forker believes that CEO duality will reduce the quality of supervision and information disclosure. 
Although China’s "listing Corporation governance standard" requires that the CEO and general manager can’t 
be the same person, but there still are a few companies having the phenomenon of CEO duality. It will lead to 
the loss of independence of the board, and cut down the effective supervision of managers. The company with 
CEO duality tends to refuse to disclose unfavorable information. Therefore, the following hypothesis was put 
forward. 
Hypothesis 3:With other conditions limited, separation of CEO and general manager has positive 
correlations with the timeliness of accounting information. Companies that separate CEO from the general 
manager are good at accounting information disclosure in time. 
Forker thinks that independent directors can make the board more responsible for investors and urge 
companies to observe the disclosure requirements, then the quality and comprehensiveness of financial 
information will be improved. Jaggi finds that companies with higher proportion of independent directors are 
more comprehensive on the information disclosure. The greater proportion of independent directors, the more 
inclined to disclose the high quality of accounting information. Independent directors make independent 
judgments about businesses and have no important relations with the company or managers in businesses or 
professions, and they are independent against the shareholders and take no position in office. Independent 
directors can make the board more responsible for investors, and urge the company to comply with the 
requirements of information disclosure to improve the quality and comprehensiveness of financial information 
disclosure. It can be predicted that the high proportion of independent directors in the board will lead to more 
comprehensive and timeliness of information disclosure. Therefore, the following hypothesis was put forward. 
Hypothesis 4: With other conditions limited, the larger numbers of independent directors of the board 
increase the reliability of accounting information, meanwhile improve the timeliness of accounting information 
disclosure. 
 
3.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Sample selection and data sources 
This research is based on GEM listing corporations and carries out the following screening procedures:(1) 
in principle, selected the listing companies before 2012 as the experimental object ; (2) culled out ST and PT; (3) 
culled out financial listing Corporations; (4)culled out the listing corporations whose data were incomplete in 
the test interval(2012-2014). Finally 852 effective observation figures from 284 sample Firms were gotten. 
Relevant business information came from Huge Tide Net, and data processing were finished by SPSS13.0 and 
Excel2003. 
3.2 Selection of variables and measurement 
3.2.1 Explained variable 
Explained variable is the timeliness of accounting information disclosure(TIME). There are two ways in 
the literature on measuring the timeliness of accounting information disclosure. One is predicted value, adopted 
by Huguoliu and Hanconghui(2009) [15], the other one is delay of annual reports by Xunyong(2009). This article 
used Xueyong's method, taking the delay of annual reports to measure the timeliness of accounting information 
disclosure[16], i.e. to use calendar days that between the end of annual reports and actual date of report disclosure 
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as proxy variable. The relationship is that the smaller time delay is and the better timeliness would be. China 
Securities Regulatory Commission requires that the deadline of disclosure of the annual report of the listing 
Corporation should be April 30th, so the change of the time delay variable range is from 0 to 120. 
3.2.2 Explaining variables 
The board of directors is the core component of the corporate governance structure, which supervises the 
operator's decisions. Fama considers that the board structure of the board will influence the efficiency of 
accounting information disclosure. The board structure is composed of the following factors: 
(1)Whether the top ten shareholders are related or not (H10).The board elected by the shareholders’ 
meeting is regarded as the representative of the shareholders to executive supervision and management 
responsibilities. If the top ten shareholders are related, the value 1 will be assigned, otherwise 0. 
(2)The scale of board(BZ). It is an important factor to influence the degree of information disclosure. 
Jensen and Murphy believe that, as the core of the company's internal governance mechanism, raising the scale 
of the board in the appropriate range will improve the efficiency of the board, meanwhile effective supervision 
and management can be done more professionally. 
(3)Whether CEO and general manager is the same or not(STH). CEO and general manager of the same 
person will lead to the loss of independence of the board, reduce the effective supervision and control of the 
manager. If CEO and general manager is the same, the value 1 will be assigned, otherwise 0. 
(4) The proportion of independent directors (PID). The number, the proportion of the independent directors 
and whether they work in the company. Independent directors is regarded as the way to resist the opportunism 
behavior of the operators, which is beneficial to strengthen the company's internal governance (Rosenste 
&Wyatt,1990). The greater proportion of independent directors, the more inclined to disclose the high quality of 
accounting information. Related variables defined as table 3-1: 
Table 3-1 variables and their definitions. 
Variable properties Variable names Variable definitions 
Explained variables the timeliness of accounting 
information disclosure(TIME) 
calendar days that between the end of annual reports and 
actual date of report disclosure. 
The scale of board(BS) The natural logarithm of the number of the board 
The proportion of independent 
directors (PID) 
Independent directors proportion of the board 
Whether the top ten shareholders are 
related or not (H10). 
If the top ten shareholders are related, the value 1 will be 
assigned, or 0. 
 
 
Explaining variables 
Whether CEO and general manager are 
the same or not(STH) 
If CEO and general manager are the same, the value 1 will be 
assigned, or 0. 
Control variables Asset liability ratio(ALR) ALR= total liability /total asset 
3.3 Model design 
The basic measurement model was constructed to test the hypothesis proposed in this paper: 
TIMEit=β0+β1BZit+β2PIDit+β3H10it+β4STHit+β5ALRit+ε 
β is the parameter to be estimated, ε is a random perturbation. 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Descriptive statistical analysis 
The result of the descriptive statistical analysis of the whole samples is shown as Table4-1. 
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Table 4-1 Descriptive statistical analysis. 
 Maximum Minimum Average value Variance Median 
Delay of annual reports 120 12 92 349 91 
the scale of board 15 3 8 2.3 8 
The proportion of 
independent directors 63% 17% 37.56% 31.18% 38% 
Asset liability ratio 90.44% 0.87% 29.12% 283 27.13% 
Relations of the top ten 
shareholders 1 0 0.28 0.2 0 
Whether CEO and general manager 
are the same or not 1 0 0.4 0.24 0 
As from the table, the delay of annual reports is 120, the minimum is 12, the variance is 349, and the 
average value is 92 that is greater than the median 91, which shows that there is a big difference in the annual 
report of the enterprises in China and most of them have a long time delay. The average value of the scale of the 
board is 8, which means that the board of the sample firms is generally maintained at eight people from 2012 to 
2014. It matches with the existing research. The proportion of independent directors which is smaller than the 
variance and the variance is 31.18. It shows that the proportion of the independent directors of the listing 
Corporations do not have much differences and the majority of them are maintained at thirty percent to forty. 
The minimum of the asset liability ratio is 0.87, the maximum is 90.44, the variance is 283, the average value is 
29.12, the median is 27.13 , which shows that the asset liability ratio of the listing Corporation had large 
differences, and most of the companies’ net interest rates are above average. The result that average value is 
bigger than the median in the top ten shareholders’ relationship of the descriptive statistical analysis explained 
that the top ten shareholders of GEM listing corporations is mostly related. In the same way, the average value is 
greater than the median in the descriptive statistical analysis of the CEO duality, which indicates that more than 
half of the CEOs are also the general manager in the listing corporations. 
4.2 Correlation analysis 
The results of correlation analysis between the variables are shown in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2 correlation analysis. 
 H10 STH Delay of annual reports BS ALR PID 
H10 1      
STH -0.001 1     
Delay of annual reports -0.007 0.18*** 1    
BS -0.32 -0.89 -0.008 1   
ALR -0.41 0.2 -0.6 -0.017 1  
PID 4.41 0.8 -0.46*** -0.503 0.031 1 
*p＜0.10；**p＜ 0.05；***p＜0.01  
As from the table, relationship of the top ten shareholders has not significantly negative correlation with 
delay of annual reports (β= -0.007, p>0.1), whether CEO and general manager is the same or not has 
significantly positive correlation with it(β=0.018,p<0.01),CEO duality has significantly positive correlation with 
it by preliminary judgment. The scale of board has not significantly negative correlation with delay of annual 
reports (β= -0.008, p>0.1) and asset liability ratio has not significantly negative correlation with it(β= 
-0.600,p>0.1). The proportion of independent directors has significantly negative correlation with 
it(β=-0.46,p<0.01). The higher the proportion of independent directors is, the better the board will observe the 
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requirements of information disclosure, which improves the quality and comprehensiveness of financial 
information disclosure by preliminary judgment. 
4.3 Regression analysis 
Before doing the regression analysis, we conducted the following model test: (1) the total linear test: Table 
2 shows that the correlation coefficient between the variables is small, the variance inflation factor VIF value is 
less than 10 (not listed with limited to the length of the table), so there is no obvious linear. (2) the variance test: 
through the residual analysis chart(not listed with limited space), the point distribution is random, there is no 
trend, there is no difference between the residual and the residual sequence. So the regression model is effective. 
The results of regression analysis between variables are shown in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3 regression analysis. 
 Delay of annual reports 
Whether CEO and general manager are the same or not 0.134(0.000)*** 
Relationship of the top ten shareholders -0.161(0.872) 
The scale of board -0.489(0.872) 
The proportion of independent directors -0.988(0.000)*** 
Asset liability ratio -1.009(0.314) 
*p＜0.10；**p＜ 0.05；***p＜0.01  
  As from the table, relationship of the top ten shareholders have not significant negative correlation with 
annual reports’ delay (T=-0.161, P> 0.1), but the significant level is not high, which illustrates the relevance of 
shareholders has little impact on the timeliness of accounting information, so hypothesis 1 is rejected. CEO 
duality is significantly positive correlated with it(T=0.134, P < 0.01).When CEO and the general manager are 
the same person, the company is more willing to improve the accounting information in time to eliminate the 
adverse effects of CEO duality, so that the hypothesis 3 is verified. The scale of board is not significantly 
negative correlated with delay of annual reports (T=-0.498, P >0.1), so that hypothesis 2 is rejected. The 
proportion of independent directors has obviously negative correlation with delay of annual reports (T=-0.988, 
P<0.01). The higher the proportion of independent directors is, the better the board will observe the 
requirements of information disclosure, which improves the quality and comprehensiveness of financial 
information disclosure, so that the hypothesis 4 has been supported. 
 
5.  ROBUSTNESS TEST 
In order to verify the robustness of the research conclusion further, under the control of different scale of 
the board, this paper uses the method of independent sample T test to analyze the differences of the average 
about delay of the annual reports. Results of T test are shown in table 5-1. 
Table 5-1: board structure and T test results for the publication of time delay. 
 Sample Average value Standard deviation T value 
H10 No 101 Yes 183 
79.26 
90.6 
30.58 
23.39 -1.24 
STH No 188 Yes 96 
89.23 
96.34 
27.52 
26.14 0.07* 
BS Big 201 Small 83 
90.13 
94.49 
21.08 
24.67 -0.023 
PID Low 207 High 77 
92.57 
90.32 
24.88 
26.64 -1.886** 
ALR Low 155 High 129 
36.84% 
28.88% 
262 
56 -0.08 
Note: * indicates significant at 0.1 level; * * indicates significant at 0.05 level; * * * indicates 
significant at 0.01. 
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6.  RESEARCH CONCLUSION AND REVELATION 
6.1 Research conclusion 
Based on taking GEM listing corporations as the sample during 2012~2014, examined the relationship 
between the board structure and the timeliness of financial statement disclosure, the following conclusions have 
been obtained:(1)whether CEO and general manager are the same or not has significantly positive correlations 
with annual reports’ delay, it shows CEO duality will greatly weaken the board’s supervision and the timeliness 
of accounting information disclosure will be heavily affected;(2) the proportion of independent directors is 
significantly negatively related to annual reports delay, which is the same with the theoretical analysis. The 
higher the proportion of independent directors is, the better quality of accounting information will be guaranteed 
and the best function of the board will be performed. (3)Hypothesis1 and hypothesis 2 are not verified in the 
experiment. The probably reason is that the reform and supervision conducted by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission made a strong effect this year, which controlled interfering internal affairs by shareholders and the 
quality of accounting information were improved. What’s more, the number of the board of the listing 
Corporation was kept among 7~9 this year, and working efficiency are also highly guaranteed, So just changing 
the scale of the board alone can’t improve the quality of accounting information. 
6.2 Research revelations 
(1) From the view of corporate governance, the reasonable proportion of independent directors has an 
optimum range, which is helpful to balance the reliability and timeliness of accounting information disclosure. 
(2) In the case of the supervision department of the listing Corporation, taking into account the requirements of 
the securities market to the company's accounting information disclosure , not only information disclosure 
criteria but also relevant policies must be formulated to lead the establishment of more suitable internal 
governance structure of listing Corporation, so as to improve the enthusiasm of accounting information 
disclosure from the internal. 
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